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PAR III" > 
The Plaintiff/ Appellant are William Turner who is a landowner of two parcels of 
real property and other landowners similarly situated who were annexed into the Salt Lake 
County M M'1* * <!»•• I ^ , l)hln «" " " '" ' ^ ' M I H H ' I I M 
Honorable Judge G. Hal Taylor * c ourt m that ()nler dc ( reed that the landowners 
w o u l ( l ^ e benefited! Ill] i theii inclusion in the \>aier -,...-.. - <i^ iiurt I  'l" ' I I he 
Landowners, Plaintiff/ Appellant, have developed and furnished its own water system for 
the included land. 
The Defendant / Appellee i iilliiii Si i I  I II In I iiiiih, \\ II Cous in incv District 
which pursuant to petition and Court Order included the Plaintiff/App e 11. \ t i ill ii it 3 th- i: • 
services to the Plaintiff / Appellant even though it assessed their property and received 
those assessments through the process of the County levying taxes from them during that 
period of time. 
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HISTORY 
Prior to April 3,1973 the various landowners who make up Hi Country Estates 
Subdivision applied to the Third District Court for Salt Lake County for the property 
contained in the Subdivision to be annexed into the Salt Lake County Water Conservancy 
District. As a part of that Court Order which annexed the land of the Plaintiffs / 
Appellants into the Water Conservancy District, the Court ORDERED "that all of said 
lands will be benefited from inclusion in the District'1. See Record page 000008. 
From 1973 until the present, each landowner has been individually been assessed, 
and those assessments collected through the taxation process, through the authority of the 
Defendant/Appellee Water Conservancy District, but the District has failed to provide any 
benefits (services) for the landowners (Plaintiff/Appellant). All water and delivery systems 
within the subdivision, have been provided through the efforts and funds of the 
Plaintiff/Appellant exclusive of any help from the Defendant/Appellee Conservancy 
District, and the maintenance efforts by the Defendant/Appellee Conservancy District, 
which has only been of recent origin , have been billed to the Subdivision as an additional 
Cost. 
Therefore the landowners in the Subdivision have not benefited from their inclusion 
into the Water Conservancy District contrary to the Order of the Third District Court on 
April 3,1973 under the Honorable Judge G. Hal Taylor. 
Plaintiffs/Appellant over the years have on numerous occasions requested that the 
District (Defendant/Appellee) bring water to the subdivision lands (Plaintiffs / Appellant), 
but the District has failed to furnish water to the lands in the subdivision. 
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The Plaintiffs/Appellant under its Complaint contends that the Third District Court, 
under its decree and pursuant to Section 17A-2-1401 et al, had continuing jurisdiction over 
this matter. 
The Plaintiffs / Appellant ask that the Defendant / Appellee be held in Contempt for 
failure to fulfill the Court Order that the Conservancy District should benefit the "lands" 
by their inclusion thereof into the Water Conservancy District-
Furthermore the Plaintiffs / Appellant requested Equitable Restitution for those 
funds collected by the District which in no manner were spent to "benefit" the Plaintiffs / 
Appellant, plus punitive damages for the Defendant's / Appellee's contemptuous failure to 
"benefit" the landowners as ordered by the District Court, 
Upon motion by the Defendant / Appellee for Judgment on the Pleadings, the Third 
District Court dismissed Plaintiff / Appellant's Complaint finding that the Defendant / 
Appellee Water Conservancy District had fulfilled the order found under annexation since 
the order only provides for administrative responsibilities or duties which were discharged. 
The Court further found that the benefit mentioned in the 1973 Court Order is to the 
County in general which has been provided and that is all that is necessary. 
The Court also base its decision upon a finding that the Statute of Limitations 
precluded bringing the action. 
The Court found that the Defendant/Appellee Water Conservancy District was 
clearly a governmental entity under the governmental immunity statute and therefore not 
subject to punitive damages. 
The Third District Court issued its Order on May 29,1996 and Plaintiff/Appellant 
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filed its Appeal on June 26,1996.. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. The Plaintiffs / Appellants consist of William Turner and a class consisting of 
property owners located in the Hi Country Estates Subdivision, the class is so numerous 
that joinder of all members is impracticable, the questions of law or fact are common to the 
whole class, that the claims of the representative party are typical of the claims of the class, 
and that the representative party will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the 
class. (See Record page 000001 paragraph 1) 
2. The Defendant / Appellee is a quasi governmental body formed pursuant to 
73-9-29 Utah Code Annotated which has now been changed to 17A-1401 et al whose 
responsibility is to furnish water to and benefit the land which is annexed. See Record 
page 000002 paragraph 2. 
3. The Plaintiff /Appellants land was annexed to the Defendant/Appellee Water 
Conservancy District through an Order of the Third District Court on April 3,1973. See 
Record page 000002 paragraph 2 and exhibit "A" page 000007. 
4. The Third District Court in its Order instructed that" all of said lands will be 
benefited from inclusion in the District". See Record page 000008. 
5. The Plaintiff / Appellants land according to the Court Order are the lands to be 
benefited by inclusion in the Defendant/Appellant Water Conservancy District. See Record 
page 000002 paragraph 4. 
6. The Plaintiff/Appellant's land has not received any benefit from inclusion in the 
District Water Conservancv District and has found it necessary to provide its own water 
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and water delivery system. See Record page 000002 paragraph 6. 
7. The failure of the Defendant/Appellee Water Conservancy District to furnish 
services is contrary to the 1973 Court Order and to the intent of the Legislature. See 
Record page 000002 paragraph 6. 
8. The Plaintiff/Appellant has not received any benefits for the funds assessed and 
collected by the Defendant/Appellee and has paid additional funds to establish a water 
delivery system and water source independent of the Defendant/Appellee. See Record page 
000003 paragraph 7, 8, 9 and 12. 
9. The Plaintiff/Appellant requested that the Defendant/Appellee be held in 
contempt of the 1973 Court Order, that the funds assessed be returned to the 
Plaintiff/Appellant, that punitive damages be assessed against the Defendant/Appellee for 
its failure to fulfill the 1973 Court Order and that the Conservancy District be ordered to 
reimburse the property owners for the amounts expended to furnish their own water 
system. See Record page 000004 paragraphs 14,15,16, and 17. 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This is an appeal from the Order and Judgment of Judge Leslie A. Lewis, Third 
Judicial District court of Salt Lake County, State of Utah. Jurisdiction is conferred upon 
this Court by Rule 3, and Rule 4 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure and UCA Rule 
78-2-2 and is given by assignment from the Utah Supreme Court to the Utah Court of 
Appeals. 
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ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
POINT I DOES SECTION 63-30-22 BAR CLAIMS FOR PUNITIVE DAMAGES 
AGAINST THE DEFENDANT/APPELLEE WATER CONSERVANCY 
DISTRICT 
POINT H WAS THE WATER CONSERVANCY DISTRICT ENTITLED TO A 
DISMISSAL OF PLAINTEFF/APPELLANT CONTEMPT OF COURT 
CLAIM? 
A. WAS THE WATER CONSERVANCY DISTRICT IN CONTEMPT 
OF THE ANNEXATION ORDER? 
B. WAS PLAINTIFF/APPELLANTS CONTEMPT OF COURT CLAIM 
BLVRRED BY UTAH CODE ANN. SECTION 17A-2-1437(3)(I)? 
C. WAS PLAINTEFF/APPELLANT CONTEMPT OF COURT CLAIM 
BARRED BY COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL? 
D. \F AS PLAINTEFF/APPELLANT CLAIM THAT THE WATER 
CONSERVANCY DISTRICT WAS IN CONTEMPT OF THE 1973 
ANNEXATION ORDER TIMELY? 
POINT HI IS THE WATER CONSERVANCY DISTRICT ENTITLED TO A 
JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS DISMISSING 
PLAINTIFF/APPELLANTS CLAIM FOR AN EQUITABLE REFUND OF 
ASSESSMENT. 
A. DOES UTAH CODE ANN. SECTION 17A-2-1437(3)(I) AND 
COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL BAR PLAINTIFF/APPELLANTS 
BQUITABLE CLAIM FOR A REFUND OF ASSESSMENT? 
B. HAVE PLAINTEFF/APPELLANT FAILED TO PLEAD AN EQUITABLE 
(TLAEM FOR A REUND OF ASSESSMENT? 
I DOES PLAINTEFF/APPELLANT HAVE TO PLEAD THAT THE 
PROPERTY ASSESSED BY THE WATER CONSERVANCY 
DISTRICT IS ILLEGAL? 
}. DOES PLATNTEFF/APPLELLANT HAVE TO PLEAD THAT HE PAID 
THE ASSESSMENT UNDER PROTEST? 
C. IS PLAINTEFF/APPELLANT EQUITABLE CLAIM FOR A REFUND OF 
ASSESSMENT BARRED BY UTAH CODE ANN. SECTION 78-12-25(3)? 
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D. IS PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT CLAIM FOR EQUITABLE ASSESSMENT 
REFUND BARRED BY UTAH CODE ANN. SECTION 78-12-31? 
E. IS PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT EQUITABLE CLAIM FOR AN 
ASSESSMENT REFUND BARRED BY HIS FAILURE TO PURSUE 
AVAILABLE AND ADEQUATE LEGAL REMEDIES? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Judgment on the Pleadings may be granted only in those matters where it is clear 
form the record that there exists no genuine issues as to material facts. The trial court is to 
assume that the facts as stated in the complaint of the non moving party are true and must 
therefore conclude that the non moving party could no prevail as a matter of law. 
No deference is to be accorded to the trial court's legal conclusions based on those 
facts. 
PRESERVATION OF ISSUES 
The issues before the Court were preserved for appeal in the trial court in 
Plaintiff/Appellants Complaint, Reply Memorandum, and in its argument before the trial 
court. See Record pages 000001 -000008, pages 000048 - 000063, and pages 000110 -
000136. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Plaintiff/Appellant claim that they should receive services where they are being 
assessed by the Defendant/Appellee Water Conservancy District. The Defendant/Appellee 
Water Conservancy District states that it is not obligated to furnish any services for the 
assessments which it receives for those properties which are annexed to it. That if it is 
benefiting the whole District by what it is doing that is sufficient. 
The Plaintiff/Appellant claims that the Statute of Limitations does not apply in the 
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assessment both because the annexation statute takes the matter outside of the statute of 
limitations and the statute if it does apply, does not start to run until the District had 
sufficient time to perform. That time to perform is now at hand. 
The last issue is that the PlaintifT/Appellant did not protest the payment of the 
assessment. The Plaintiff/Appellant argues that it did not have to protest the assessment as 
the Water Conservancy District was under a mandate of the 1973 Annexation Order to 
Benefit the land being annexed which was not done. 
ARGUMENT 
Point I 
SECTION 63-30-22 DOES NOT BAR CLAIMS FOR PUNITIVE DAMAGES 
AGAINST THE SALT LAKE WATER CONSERVANCY DISTRICT 
The Defendant/Appellee, Salt Lake County Water Conservancy District, is not a 
Political subdivision as defined under the Governmental Immunity Act. A political 
subdivision (as defined under the Governmental Immunity Act) "means any county, city, 
town, school district, public transit district, or other governmental subdivision or public 
corporation". It should be noted that the definition is defined narrowly and does not 
include a Water Conservancy District even though it does include entities which are quite 
similar such as school district and public transit district. 
Under Tygesen v. Magna Water Co., 226 P.2d 127 (Utah 1950), the court defines a 
Water Conservancy District as an improvement district which is neither fish nor fowl - it 
being a quasi municipality which "lay the principle that they who receive the benefits 
should pay for them" 
Even if the Water Conservancy was protected by the Governmental Act, since the 
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responsibilities are non governmental and are proprietary in nature, they would fall under 
the exceptions to the Governmental Immunity Act. (Section 63-30-3 "all governmental 
entities are immune from suit for any injury which results from the exercise of a 
governmental function,") That question being whether or not furnishing water is a 
proprietary function or a governmental function. 
The Tygesen Court supports this proposition by questioning whether the County 
ever had a duty of furnishing water by stating that "The Improvement District Act 
accomplished the same thing as to the water and sewer systems by lifting from the county 
the necessity of furnishing water and sewer facilities, if indeed it ever had that duty, but 
leaving with the county its ordinary functions in the district area relating to health, 
policing, etc.." 
In Salt Lake County, historically, water was supplied as a proprietary function by 
the citizens as from early days various citizens held the water rights to the various steams 
which came into the valley and the water was not supplied as a governmental function. 
Under Kirk v. State 784 P. 2d 1255 1989 (Ct. of Appeals), four factors were to be 
considered to determine whether an activity is proprietary or governmental: 1. whether 
the activity is something that is done for the general public good, 2. whether it is 
generally regarded as a public responsibility; 3. whether there is any special pecuniary 
benefit to the city; and 4. whether it is in competition with free enterprise. Water 
Conservancy Districts are in competition with private enterprises such as water companies 
which are everywhere in the Salt Lake County area. 
Obviously then, the Defendant/Appellee is competing with private enterprise as to 
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furnishing water. It has generally been the responsibility of the private sector to furnish 
water to landowners, which places the actions of the Defendant/Appellee as a proprietary 
function which waives its governmental immunity. There are numerous Utah cases which 
define quasi municipalities as different from city or county governments. 
In McQuilllin Mun. Corp. (3rd Ed.) Sec. 2.07a; we find the following definition: 
"A quasi-municipal corporation is a public agency created or authorized by the legislature 
to aid the state in, or to take charge of, some public or state work, other than community 
government, for the general welfare. 'Quasi municipal* corporations are public in nature, 
but not strictly speaking, municipal corporations. They are bodies which possess a limited 
number of corporate powers and which are low down in the scale or grade of corporate 
existence, and consist of various local government areas established to aid the 
administration of public functions" Id., Sec 2.13 
Therefore, Plaintiff is not precluded from its punitive damage action in this matter 
as the Defendant District is not the same type of governmental agency as contemplated for 
governmental immunity. 
Point H 
THE WATER CONSERVANCY DISTRICT IS NOT ENTITLED TO A 
DISMISSAL OF PLAINTIFF'S CONTEMPT OF COURT CLAIM 
A. THE WATER CONSERVANCY DISTRICT IS IN CONTEMPT OF 
THE ANNEXATION ORDER 
The Court is very clear in its Order of April 3,1973. The Court states, not as a 
finding, but as an Order that: 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that all of said lands will be benefited 
from inclusion in the District;" 
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The Court in its1 order does not make a specific finding that the lands will be 
benefited but it Orders that the lands will be benefited (a specific duty is given to the Water 
Conservancy District). The Amended Order of April 3,1974, reads exactly as the Order of 
April 3,1973 except for a description correction. The lands will be benefited from inclusion 
in the District. 
The Court Order is not designated as a finding of fact but is a direct Order of the 
Court bearing all the authority and majesty of the Court. To not follow that Order is 
Contempt of Court. 
The Water Conservancy District is given great power but the power does not come 
directly from the vote of the citizens. That is why the Court maintains jurisdiction in order 
to be sure that the power given is not abused as has happened in the case at hand. 
Historically the Board of Directors of the Water Conservancy Districts were 
appointed by the Court. The Supreme Court found that this was a mis-use of Judicial 
power and declared it unconstitutional. The legislature then amended the law and directed 
that the County appoint the Directors but still maintained that the Court had continuing 
jurisdiction. 
The Water Conservancy District was formed by the Legislature to do what the 
individual could not do by himself and for which to tax the whole county for special areas 
would be unequitable. There is no other way that the Plaintiff/Appellants lands can be 
benefited by the Water District (Defendant/Appellee) but to be furnished water. That has 
not been done, and is not being presently done. Therefore, the Defendant/Appellee is in 
Contempt of the 1973 Court Order to Benefit the land. 
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B. PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT'S CONTEMPT OF COURT CLAIM IS NOT 
BARRED BY UTAH CODE ANN. SECTION 17A-2-1437(3)(i) 
Section I7A-2-1437(3)(i) does not bar the Contempt or punitive damages. That 
section only goes to the determination of the facts by the court which allow it to Order an 
Annexation of land to the Water Conservancy District. That is not in question here. The 
Court made its findings and upon those findings Ordered that "all of said lands will be 
benefited". There is no fancy footwork that the Defendant/Appellee can do that lessens 
that Order. 
C. PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT' CONTEMPT OF COURT CLAIM IS NOT 
BARRED BY COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL 
Plaintiff/Appellant's complaint does not come from the fact that the Court had to 
find that a benefit was possible at the time the Annexation was approved. The only 
problem is that the Defendant/Appellee never put forth the necessary effort to promulgate 
that benefit. Instead it assessed the PlaintifT/Appellant while PlaintifT/Appellant furnished 
their own water system and drilled their own well. 
When asked to help repair the water system which the PlaintifT/Appellant installed, 
the Defendant/Appellee had the tenacity to charge for what ever help was expended even 
though it was receiving assessment dollars for which it gave no pro quid quo. 
The Judge Tayor Court realizing the temptation to the Water Conservancy District 
in the particular situation, specifically Ordered the Defendant/Appellee Water 
Conservancy District to benefit the lands annexed. The Defendant/Appellee has in no way 
alleged any benefit which it has given to the PlaintifT/Appellant*s land. 
Collateral Estoppel is not at issue here. Failure to follow the Courts specific Order is 
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at issue. The Defendant/Appellee was to benefit the lands annexed. It has not done that 
since 1973. It is certainly by now in contempt of the 1973 Court Order. 
D. PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT CLAIM THAT THE WATER 
CONSERVANCY DISTRICT IS IN CONTEMPT OF THE 1973 
ANNEXATION ORDER IS TIMELY 
Plaintiffs twenty-two year delay in filing this action for contempt of the Court Order 
does not foreclose their contempt claim. The Order of the Court is a continuing Order. It 
is not for a specific period of time, but is for all that period of time from when the land is 
annexed to the District. Under Section 17A-2-1406 "The district court in and for the 
county in which the petition for the organization of a water conservancy district has been 
filed, shall thereafter for all purposes of this part, except as hereinafter otherwise provided, 
maintain and have original and exclusive jurisdiction, xxx....xxx, without regard to the 
usual limits of its jurisdiction/9 
Considering the complex nature of furnishing water, the great cost, and the large 
amount of time necessary to construct such a system, the 22 year period is not 
unreasonable. Plaintiffs patience is to be applauded not condemned. It becomes 
judgmental as to when the contempt arises. Certainly not within the first year, but 
certainly by the twenty second year. 
As stated in American Tierra Corp. v City of West Jordan, 840 P.2d 757 (Utah 
1992), to determine if the statute of limitation has run, you must first determine when the 
period began to run. "The correct view, however, is that the limitation period begins to run 
as of the date on which the action could have been maintained to a successful conclusion/1 
A right of action accrues when a wrong has been incurred that gives a right to bring and 
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sustain a suit. In the instance before us, the period starts when this court determines that 
the Defendant District had adequate time to promulgate a benefit to the lands as ordered. 
Certainly after 22 years that period of time has started. 
Therefore, Plaintiffs action should not be dismissed due to the time between the 
1973 Order and the bringing of this action. 
Point ffl 
THE WATER CONSERVANCY DISTRICT IS NOT ENTITLED TO A 
JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADING DISMISSING PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT'S' 
CLAIM FOR AN EQUITABLE REFUND OF ASSESSMENT 
A. UTAH CODE ANN. SECTION 17A-2-1437(3)(i) AND COLLATERAL 
ESTOPPEL DO NOT BAR PLAINTIFFS/APPELLANT'S' 
EQUITABLE CLAIM FOR A REFUND OF ASSESSMENT. 
Contrary to Defendant/Appellee's allegations, the land of the Plaintiff/Appellant has 
not been benefited by its annexation to the Water Conservancy District. That is the reason 
for the lawsuit. Since the funds given to the Water Conservancy District have not been 
used to benefit the lands and their owners to date, logically they should be returned with 
interest. If the Defendant/Appellee District decides to do something in the future, then 
those future funds collected through the taxation power of the county, may be used to 
benefit the land in the future. 
The 1973 Court did not dispose of the issue before us. While it is true that for the 
court to annex the land to the Water District, it had to find a benefit to the land owners, 
that determination has nothing to do with the specific and clear order of the Court that the 
Water Conservancy District which Order by the Court stated "THAT all of said lands will 
be benefited from inclusion in the District". 
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The Defendant/Appellee alleges that Plaintiff/Appellant must prove that the land 
has not been and will not be benefited by the annexation to the District. That certainly is a 
question of fact which must be ruled upon by a trier of fact which is the issue before the 
Court. It is hard to imagine any benefit having been received at present, since the 
Defendant/Appellee has not furnished any water to the Plaintiff/Appellant in over 22 years. 
Furthermore, there are no plans to furnish water in the near future by the 
Defendant/Appellee District, and finally, the system which the Plaintiff/Appellant have 
installed is furnishing water sufficiently abundant for the contemplated future needs. 
The 1973 Court Order and Utah Code Ann. Section 17A-2-1437(3)(i) have not 
resolved the issue and do not by collateral estoppel bar Plaintiff/Appellant equitable claim 
as the law allows for the annexation to be established upon a potential benefit and the court 
had to find a potential benefit to the owner of the land. 
The Supreme Court said in American Tierra Corp. Case that "This court long has 
recognized a common law exception to governmental immunity for equitable claims." and 
then states "Furthermore, this court already has recognized that an action to recover 
unlawful charges for city services is equitable in nature. See El Rancho, 565 P.2d at 779-
80" 
This is not in question. The 1973 Court in this instance went further in that it 
Ordered that the owners of the land benefit from the Annexation. To date this has not 
happened. 
B. PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT HAVE NOT FAILED TO PLEAD AN 
EQUITABLE CLAIM FOR A REFUND OF ASSESSMENT 
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1. Plaintiff does not have to plead that the 
assessment levied by the Water 
Conservancy District are illegal 
Plaintiff/Appellant do not deny that the claims for the refund of funds levied by the 
Defendant/Appellee and collected as a tax, is an equitable claim. The Plaintiff/Appellee has 
requested that those funds be returned as the Defendant/Appellee District has failed to 
comply with a direct court order and therefore has no legal right to those funds. The 
collection of the funds is in contemplation of rendering a benefit to the lands annexed. 
That benefit has never been received. Logically then, those funds were illegally collected. 
Breaking of a Court Order is an illegal act. Plaintiff does not have to specifically allege an 
illegal act to maintain its position in this case on this matter. 
Equity demands that where a party is being taken advantage of by another party 
who is contemptuously disobeying the law, that the party injured should be compensated 
for that act. The Water Conservancy District Defendant/Appellee has for the last 22 years 
taken funds from the Plaintiff/Appellant and has failed to fulfill that Court Order which 
gives it the authority to collect the funds. The Defendant/Appellee Water Conservancy 
District has not benefited the lands as ordered under that Court Order which authorized 
and gave life to the Annexation and all powers derived thereunder. 
2. Plaintiff/Appellant does not have to plead that he paid 
his assessment under protest 
Plaintiff/Appellant are not barred from this matter because they failed to pay their 
assessment under protest. The Water Conservancy District is not the taxing entity. The 
County is the taxing entity. The Water Conservancy District simply establishes the amount 
of assessment it desires to be levied and the County becomes the entity which collects the 
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assessment as a tax. 
The issues before the Court is whether or not the lands have been benefited by the 
Defendant/Appellee District as directed by the District Court under the Honorable Judge 
Taylor and if they have not as alleged by the Plaintiff/Appellant what the District 
Defendant/Appellee should do to benefit the lands. 
1. Should the monies assessed and collected by the taxing entity and paid to the 
Defendant/Appellee, be returned to the owners of the lands? 
2. Should the Defendant/Appellee be Ordered by the Court to immediately present 
a plan to the Court as to how they will benefit the land owners in the future? 
3. Should the Defendant/Appellee be Ordered to purchase the water system now 
furnishing water to the lands which are the subject of this lawsuit and to take over the 
operation of that system? 
The tax protest as contemplated under Section 59-2-1327 does not pertain to the 
matter before us at this time. That pertains to the taxing entity which actually does the 
collection. This problem is not between the Plaintiff/Appellant and the County who is the 
Tax Collector. This problem is between the Plaintiff/Appellant and the Defendant/Appellee 
Water Conservancy District. An entity which is quasi governmental. It only has those 
certain governmental powers as given to it by the Legislature. 
The Water Conservancy District is basically a private business which is given some 
governmental authority in order to facilitate the objectives of the conservation and delivery 
of water to the various lands in Salt Lake County. It is kept under close supervision of the 
District Court by continuing jurisdiction to insure that it does not abuse its authority and 
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gains its rights over property by a court authorized annexation. When the Court 
authorized the annexation in this particular instance, it Ordered that the lands Benefit 
from the annexation. This has not happened. The lands have not benefited from the 
annexation but have had to furnish or obtain their water from sources other than the 
Defendant/Appellee District because the Defendant/Appellee Water Conservancy District 
has refused to furnish that water. 
The date wherein the Statute of Limitations begins to run must be determined by 
the Court. At what point was the Defendant/Appellee placed into contempt? At the time 
the Court determines that fact, then the time of the Statute of Limitation which ever one is 
used starts to run unless that Statute of Limitation has been waived as argued earlier by 
the enabling legislation. 
C. PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT EQUITABLE CLAIM FOR A REFUND OF 
ASSESSMENT IS NOT BARRED BY UTAH CODE ANN. SECTION 
78-12-25(3) 
The Starting of the Clock is not at the time of the first payment of the assessment. 
Certainly, considering the complexity of operating a water system for the 
Plaintiff/Appellant, the contempt did not start at the first assessment levy. Any action 
brought at that time would not have had a chance of succeeding. Did it start after 22 years 
of collecting assessments and failing to provide the benefit as Ordered by the Taylor Court? 
Did it start when the owners of the land obtained their own water system? 
Certainly after 22 years the intent of the Defendant/Appellee District is discernable. 
That intent being to not furnish any benefit to the lands but to continue to require 
assessments be paid by the land owners of the Plaintiff/Appellant for nothing in return. 
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Although Plaintiff/Appellant does not admit that the statute of limitations has run 
on any of the assessments paid, even if the statute of limitations has canceled out part of the 
assessment paid, it has not canceled those assessments paid over the last four year. 
D. PLAINTIFFS' CLAIM FOR AN EQUITABLE ASSESMENT REFUND 
IS NOT BARRED BY UTAH CODE ANN. SECTION 78-12-31 
Section 78-12-31 is not applicable here as it relates to an officer or a defacto officer 
who collects taxes. That is not the fact situation here. This lawsuit is not against any tax 
collector it is against the Defendant/Appellee Water Conservancy District. 
E. PLAINTIFFS' EQUITABLE CLAIM FOR A TAX ASSUMENT IS NOT 
BARRED BY HIS FAILURE TO PURSUE AVAILABLE AND 
ADEQUATE LEGAL REMEDIES. 
Plaintiff/Appellant sought numerous times for the Defendant/Appellee to provide 
water for their lands. The Defendant/Appellee has ignored their requests for water over 
the years. They have furnished water to other areas annexed after the Plaintiff/Appellant. 
The individual yearly assessment is not the question. The question is that the 
Defendant/Appellee has had 22 years to furnish water to the Plaintiff/Appellant and has 
failed to fulfill its 1973 Order from the Court. 
The Defendant/Appellee recently has shown its destain for that Court Order of 1973 
and 1974 by furnishing some work on the present water source for the Plaintiff/Appellant 
and has charged them extra for that labor. This is the point at which the 
Plaintiff/Appellant determined that the Defendant/Appellee was never in the foreseeable 
future going to comply with the Judge Tayor Court Order of 1973 that the 
Defendant/Appellee BENEFIT the lands annexed. 
The procedures contained in 17A-2-1428 is for a party to protest a certain tax 
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because it is too high or inappropriate. The procedures contained in 17A-2-1438, -1450, -
1452 are there for lands that wish to be excluded from the District. 
Plaintiff/Appellant are seeking neither of the above. They desire that the 
Defendant/Appellee Water District comply with the " 1973" Court order and BENEFIT 
Plaintiff/Appellant lands. That to further that end, the funds collected should be returned 
to the lands to reimburse those expenditures which were necessary to furnish the water, the 
Water Conservancy District was order to furnish. 
CONCLUSION 
Judge G. Hal Taylor signed an Order on April 3,1973 which ORDERED "THAT 
all of said lands will be benefited from inclusion in the District;". Up to this time, there has 
been no benefit to the lands annexed to the Water Conservancy District. Under the 
legislation which gives authority to the Water Conservancy District, the Court has 
continuing jurisdiction. This is the proper venue for this action to be brought. 
The 1973 Court gave the Order, the Defendant/Appellee Water Conservancy 
District has failed to follow that Order. Its failure is justification for punitive damages for 
the contemptuous actions of the Defendant/Appellee. Punitive damages are an insurance 
that a party will know that if it so acts with disrespect to this Court in the future, it will 
pay to so act. 
The statute of limitations and refund of taxes does not accurately describe the facts. 
The Defendant/Appellee is a quasi municipality. As such it has only those powers given by 
the legislature for those purposes defined by the legislature. This is not the same type of 
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entity as a city, a county, or state nor does it have the same protection. It is a basically a 
proprietary entity which is given some of the powers of a government entity in order to 
effect its designed end result. 
The Water Conservancy District does not have the power to tax by itself, but only 
the power to set an assessment, which is then collected by the taxing authority. This power 
is only over those lands which have been annexed to the Water Conservancy District under 
color of law through the authority of the District Court. That District Court is given 
continuing jurisdiction over matters which may arise in the Water Conservancy District. 
The Officials (Directors) of the Water Conservancy District are not elected from the 
electorate as a city or county are but are appointed by the County Commission and 
therefore this court has jurisdiction to see that its Orders have been followed and the 
ability to hold the Defendant/Appellee Water Conservancy District in Contempt. 
Arguments for statute of limitations are not useable in this instance. 
Plaintiff/Appellant brought the action timely when considering the complex nature of 
furnishing water. But 22 years is long enough to wait for the benefits as ordered by the 
court. 
The District Court was wrong in dismissing the Plaintiff/Appellant's Complaint on 
the Pleadings. The Defendant/Appellee Water Conservancy District is accountable for its 
actions or lack thereof in providing a "Benefit" to the Plaintiff/Appellant's land as ordered 
by the 1973 Court. They do not have the immunity of a city or county as a governmental 
entity. They must do what is ordered by the Court. It is inequitable for them to make 
assessments on land and then to furnish no services. 
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This court should deny the ruling of the District Court and send this action back by 
overruling the Third District Courts Dismissal of Plaintiff/Appellant's Complaint. 
Dated this 2fnd day of January 1997. 
Wesley F. Sine 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant 
27 
CERTIFICATION OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the above Brief of the 
Plaintiff/Appellant mailed, postage prepaid this 2'nd day of January 1997 to the 
Defendant/Appellees by addressing it to: 
RED) LEWIS, ESQ. 
Salt Lake County Water Conservancy District 
P.O. Box 70 
West Jordan, Utah 84084 
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line of S e c 8# 2640 feet, m/1 to the *TW corner of said Sec. 8; thence 
S. along the W. line of said Sec- S0 1320 feet, m/1; thence W. 1320 feet, 
m/I; fhenceV^ 1320 feet, m/1; thence S. 132*2 feet, m/1; thence N. 1320 
feet, m/1; thence E. 1320 feet, m/1; thence N. 2640 feet, m/1; thence 
E. 1320 feet, m/1 to th«4V. line of Sec- 5; thence N. along said W. line 
2640 feet, m/1; thence E. 3960 feet, m/1; thence N. 1320 feet, m/1 to the 
N. line of said Sec. 5; thence E. along said N. line 1320 feet, m/1, to 
the point of beginning. 
Excepting the following: 
Beg. at a point S. 505. 00 feet and W. 625. 00 feet from the N. quarter 
corner of S e c 9# T. 4 S. , R. 2 W., SLBfeM, and running thence S. 
720. 00 feet; thence E. 1945. 00 feet; thence K. 720. 00 feet; thence W. 
1945. 00 feet to the point of beginning. 
Also excepting the following: 
The SW quarter of the SE quarter, and the SE quarter of the SW quarter 
of Sec 9, T* 4 S . , R. 2W. , SLB&M. 
Also excepting the following: 
Comm. 1M. 58* 24* E. 2274 feet from the SW corner of Sec. 16, T. 4 
S. R. 2 W., S13&M, and running thence S. 26* 30f E. 74. 5 feet; thence 
S. 66* 53* E. 189- 5 feet; thence S. 43* CV E. 204 feet; thence S. 25* 20* 
E. 106 feet; thence S. 44* 17* E. 359 feet; thence N. 15* 15* *W. 206. 8 feet; 
thence N. 49* 301 W. 197-0 feet; thence N. 37* 30* W. 152.5 feet; thence 
N. 32* IV W. 187.5 feet; thence N. 68*44* W. 109. 2 feet; thence N. 46* 
51« W. 117 feet; fLence S. 34 M31 V. 103. 5 feet to the point of beginning. 
Also excepting the following: 
Beg. at the S. quarter corner of Sec 5, T. 4 S. , R. 2 W. , SLB&M, and 
running thence N. 1320 feet, m/1 to the K. line of the SW quarter of 
the SE quarter of said S e c 5; thence E. 2640 feet, more or less to the 
E. line of Sec" 5; thence &. along said E. line 1320 feet, m/1 to the 
SB corner of said Sec \5; thence W. 2640 feet to the point of beg. 
Also excepting: 
Beg. at a point at the 2fW corner of the^ SW quarter of the SE Quarter of 
S e c 5, T. 4 S. B* 2 W./ Sl£ScM, and running thence S. 89* 381 58" W. 
1321.42 feet; thence H, 0* 23* 47** W. 1319- 99 feet; thence N. 89* 38' 58" 
E. 1325. 28 feet; thence S. 0**1* 45" E.M319- 99 feet to the point of beg. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that all of said lands will be benefited from 
inclusion in the District; that the owners of the land have petitioned for annexation, and 
that they should be represented by the present directors as a part of the division in 
which each tract of land Is located. 
Dated this of 'April, 1973. «v. 
w *pEST ^ 
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2 5 3 0 1 0 4 IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTER 3 1973 
STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF THE ORGANIZA-
TION OF THE SALT LAKE COUNTY 
WATER CONSERVANCY DISTRICT, : No. 92340 
PURSUANT TO CHAPTER 9, TITLE 73 , 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 1953, AS : O R D E R 
AMENDED. 
Upon motion of the Salt Lake County Water Conservancy Dis t i i c t , by and 
through "its attorney of record , Edward W. Clyde, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the 
following described lands should b e , and they are hereby annexed to the Salt Lake County 
Water Conservancy Di s tr i c t , to-wit : 
Commencing at the NE corner of Lot 54, Shadow Mountain Subdivision, located 
in the NE Quarter of the NW Quarter of Sec. 11, T. 2 S. R. I E . , SLBScM, 
and running thence N. 86* 02* E . 4 8 . 3 9 feet; thence N. 63 * 19' E. 100 feet; 
thence N. 132 feet to the center of Dry Creek; thence southerly along said 
creek to a point due North f rom the beginri-g; thence S. 133. 32 feet to the 
beginning. 0 . 4 2 acre . 
Commencing N. 87* AV E . 35. 83 feet from the NE corner of Lot 55, Shadow 
Mountain Subdivision, located in the NE Quarter of the NW Quarter of Sec . 12, 
T. 2 S. R. I E . , SLBStM, and running the-ce N. 63* 01 f E. 78 feet; thence 
N. 86 # 02 ! E. 51. 51 feet; thence N. 133. 32 feet to the center of Dry Creek 
ditch; thence S. 71* 10' W. 15. 35 feet; thence S. 66* 34' 50" W. along said 
center 115. 92 feet; thence S. 121. 14 feet to the beginning. Less Niriiloa Drive. 
(0 .29 acre) 
Beg. at the SW corner of Sec . 33 , T. 3 S. ?.. 2 W. , SLLkM, and running ther.ee 
N. 0* 43* 35M W. along the s e c t i o n line 1325. 78 feet to the N. line of the SW 
Quarter of the SW quarter of said sect ion; thence S. 89° 53' 17" E. 2459. 11 
feet to the S. l ine of State Highway U - l l l ; thence along said S. Line as fol-
lows: S. 69* 30' E . 463. 92 feet; thence S. 73* 35' E. 338 .70 feet; thence S. 
7 8 * 1 0 ' E . 555. 45 feet; thence S. 60 # 05« E. 262. 20 feet; thence S. 6 6 ° 4 5 ' E. 
344. 39 feet; thence S. 80• 031 E. 180. 30 fee:: thence leaving said S. line S. 
81* 00' W. 4 9 9 . 0 5 feet; thence N. 8 9 # 51' 27M W. 1160. 10 feet; thence S. 0 ' 
15' 52" E. 578. 95 feet; thence N. 89* 51' 0:" W. 165. 72 feet to the S. Quarter 
corner of said Sec . 33, a aid point a l so being the N. quarter corner of Sec . 4 
T. 4 S . R. 2 W. , SLBScM, and running'therce S. 3960 feet, more of l e s s ; the-
1320 feet, m/1; thence S. 1320 feet , m/1; to the North line of Sec. 9, T. 4 
S. R. 2 W. , SLBStM; thence E. along said N. line 2640 feet, m/1; thence 
S. 1320 feet m/1; thence E. 1320 f e e t , m/1 , to the E. line of said Sec. 9f 
thence S. along the E. line of Sec . 9, Sec . 16 and Sec. 21, 11610 feet, 
m / 1 , to the E. Quarter corner cf said Sec . 21: thence W. 132'J feet, ^ 
m / 1 , thence S. 1320 feet , m/1; thencs W, 3450 feet , m/1 to the W. ^ 
l ine of said Sec . 21; thence Northwester ly along said sect ion l ine, ^ 
1320 feet, m/1 to the W. quarter corner of said Sec . 21; thence \ 
S. 1320 feet, m / 1 , thence W. 1320 feet , m/1, thence N. 1320 feet, 
m / 1 , th-n<-e E . 52«0 f e - t , m/1; thenc- N. 1320 feet, m/I; thence W. 
3960 feet, m/1 , to the W. l ine of said Sec . 2t; thence N. 3960 feet m/1 
to the W. quarter corner of Sec . 16; thence VT. 2640 feet, m/1; thence N. 
7920 feet, m/1 , to the N. quarter corner of Sec. 8, thene: W. alone caid N. \ ; 
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